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1. Is testimony of an uncharged rape admissible under California Evidence Code § 1101 
(West 1989) to address a rape defendant's intent when the defendant admits engaging in 
intercourse and only raises the defense of actual consent and when the defendant and the 
prosecuting witness proffer irreconcilable accounts of the events?
2. Even if testimony of an uncharged rape is admissible to address a material issue, do the 
facts in the uncharged rape exhibit a high degree of common features with the facts in the 
instant case to prove by direct inference the defendant's intent or common scheme or plan?
3. If the uncharged rape is relevant to address a material issue, did the trial court abuse its 
discretion by admitting the evidence because the probative value of the evidence did not 
substantially outweigh its prejudicial effect?
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PETITIONER’S BRIEF ON THE MERITS
On appeal from the Judgment of the Superior Court 
of the State of California, County of Orange 
The Honorable Leonard H. McBride, Judge
Review of the Decision of the Court of Appeal, 
Fourth District, Division 'nirec
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Preliminary Statement
Petitioner, Jason Michael Balcom, was charged with forcible rape, robbeiy, burglary, 
and the use of a firearm in the commission of these offenses, (C.T. 37-38.) Although he was 
convicted of robbery, the jury did not reach a verdict on the counts of forcible rape, burglary, 
and the charge relating to the use of a firearm. (CT. 142, 146.) A second trial was held on 
the charges of forcible rape and the use of a firearm in the commission of the offense.
In the second trial, the trial court admitted evidence of a Michigan rape for which the 
defendant had been convicted. (C.T. 154-57.) Defense counsel objected on the grounds that
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Balcom's intent was not a material issue since Balcom only raised the defense of actual 
consent and admitted having sex with the prosecuting witness. (CT. 677: 7-13.) The court 
held that the evidence was relevant to address the defendant’s intent stating that intent is 
always an issue in a rape case since "it is part of the charge against the will Of the person ** 
(R.T. 677:19-21.) Petitioner was found guilty of forcible rape, a violation of Cat Penal Code 
section 261 (West 1989). (CT. 229.)
The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the defendant’s intent was a material issue 
and that the Michigan rape was relevant to prove intent People v. Balcom. 1 Cal.App.4th 
354, 364 (1991). Moreover, it held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling 
that the probative value of the Michigan rape substantially outweighed its prejudicial effect 
Id at 365. On January 30, 1992, this Court granted Balcom’s petition for review.
Statement of the Facts
The Defendant’s Case
Approximately eleven days prior to the alleged rape, Balcom accompanied his friend 
Charles Tate to Ms. B.’s apartment complex on 2511 Sunflower St to visit Jace Ovcrcash,
Ms, B.’s housemate. When they arrived, Ovcrcash opened the door and invited them in. Ms. 
B. was the only other person home. (R.T. 1117:13-26; 1118:1-3.) While Overcash and Tate 
went into another room to discuss a personal matter, Balcom and Ms. B. chatted in the living 
room for approximately twenty minutes before Tate returned. (R.T. 1119:13-23.)
On July 22. 1989, Balcom again accompanied Tate to find Ovcrcash because Tate was 
supposed to deUver drugs to him. (R.T. 1121:1.) Both men went to Ovcrcash’s apartment in 
the evening where they found him and Ms. B. (R.T. 1121:12-21.) After a brief visit, all of
A
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the occupants left the apartment Ms. B. told Balcom that she had to go to her car to get 
something. They all walked to Tate’s car, and Tate and Ovcrcash entered the car and drove 
away. Balcom and Ms. B. then walked to Ms. B.’s car and took a roundabout path back to 
thF apartment (R.T. 1122-1124.) ~
At the apartment Balcom and Ms. B. sat and conversed for about forty-five minutes 
until Overcash and Tate returned (R.T. 1124:21-26.) At this time Oveicash expressed a 
desire to buy a gold rope chain that Balcom was wearing for $250. (R.T. 1125:21-26; 1126:1- 
2.) Because Overcash did not have the money, he stated he would pay Balcom the following 
day along with the money he owed Tate. (R.T. 1126:6-14.) Tate later asked Balcom to pick 
up the money Ovcrcash owed him the following day; Balcom agreed (R.T. 1127:16-17.)
Around noon the next day, Balcom knocked on Ms. B. and Overcash’s door. (R.T. 
1128:22-23.) When there was no answer, he spent the day at the nearby Southcoast Plaza 
visiting friends and watching movies. (R,T. 1129:1-6.) In the evening, he returned to Ms.
B.’s apartment where Ms. B. greeted and invited him in. He explained his reason for the 
visit, and she told him that Overcash would return shortly. (R.T. 1129:22-26; 1130:1-11.) 
While waiting for Ovcrcash, the two conversed and eventually went into the bedroom. 
Subsequently, Balcom and Ms. B. engaged in foreplay and consensual sexual intercourse.
(R.T. 1130:13-23.)
After intercourse, Balcom asked Ms. B. where Ovcrcash was. (R,T. 1131:1-3.) She 
told him that Ovcrcash did not intend to return or pay Balcom the money he owed him, and 
Balcom became very upset (R.T. 1131:11-15.) Because he assumed that "she was in it with 
Mr. Ovcrcash." he demanded the money from her. (R.T. 1131:17-24.) He believed that she
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was involved in the deal because on the previous day she had asked Oveicash if he wanted 
to take the ATM card and go get money out as opposed to going all the way out to Costa 
Mesa, (R.T. 1132:4-9.) When Ms. B. refused to pay. Balcom asked her to give him her 
AIM card, and when she refused, he took it from her purse. After telling hff he needed 
"coUatcral" for the payment, he took a camera from her dresser. (R.T. 1133:8-19.) Ms. B. 
started screaming and threw the camera at him. (R.T. 1133:22-25.) Scared and upset by her 
reaction, he tied her arms and legs with some belts. (R.T. 1134:1-4.) When Ms. B. threatened 
to scream rape, he proceeded to use bandaimas to gag her mouth. He left her apartment with 
her ATM card, camera, and car keys, (R.T. 1134:12-26; 1135:1-15.)
A number of witnesses corroborated the defendant’s story. Mary Vivian Ray. a 
security guard at the Woodsidc Village Complex where Ms. B. lived, testified that she had 
seen Balcom on the premises of the complex sometime during June or early July. (R.T. 
1042:16-22; 1045:4-12.) She testified that on one occasion she had stopped him. requested 
identification, and followed him. She observed him enter Ms. B. and Ovcrcash’s apartment 
(R.T. 1045:14-26; 1046:1-24.) Ray also testified that she observed Balcom on the premises a 
few days later with another black man. (R.T. 1047:9-16.)
Saeid Hariri, the Woodsidc complex manager, testified that he had seen Ms. B. and 
Balcom together on several occasions. (R.T. 1075:7-12.) He testified that Ms. B*s demeanor 
a few days after the alleged rape was very calm and collected. (R.T. 1072:17.) When Ms. B. 
applied for a new key, Hariri asked her how the person who stole her car key found her 
parking space, and he testified that she "ignored" his question and acted as if "she was trying 
not to give information." (R.T. 1072:7-15.) Hariri admitted that Ms. B. sued his apartment
complex in a civil suit stemming from the incident (R.T. 1081:1-2.) In addition. Leonard 
Greco. Ms. B,*s boyfriend at the time of the incident testified that the morning after the 
incident, Ms. B. had come to his apartment and told him that two men assaulted her the 
pf^ious night (R.T 1244:20-25.) He testified that Ms. B. told him that sh^had taken the 
two assailants out to her car after the incident (R.T. 1245:4-14.)
The Prosecution*s Case
Ms, B. claims that she had never seen Balcom before the day of the alleged rape. On 
July 23, 1988, Ms. B. was reclining on a couch, watching television late at night alone in her 
apartment (R.T. 762:16-22.) At about IdX) A.M. she claims a man knocked on her door 
looking for a person named "Mike.” (R,T. 764:14-16.) Shortly thereafter, there was another 
knock on the door. Instead of answering the door, she went to the patio and peeked over the 
fence. (R.T. 766:8-10.) She claimed that Balcom stood there.
According to Ms. B.. Balcom ran and "catapulted over" the 5-foot 5-inch fence with 
one hand, while he was carrying a rifle in his other hand. (R.T. 773:8-11.) She testified that 
he asked her for her purse and money. She followed his instructions to get her wallet and her 
ATM card and to give him her PIN number. She claimed that he threatened, "If I find out 
that this is the wrong number m come back and loll you." (R.T. 780:11-23.) Balcom 
allegedly led her to the bedroom at gunpoint, tied her wrists, gagged her and proceeded to 
rape her. (R,T. 779-783.) She claimed that she complied because she was scared and that 
Balcom was holding the rifle during the entire process. (R.T, 783:9-11; 844:21-26.) After he 
forced her to have sex. she claims that she told him where her car was located. Balcom then 
left, taking an orange towel, carrying the camera, wallet, and a glass jar full of quarters. (R.T.
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787:18-26; 788:1-5.)
Ms. B. admitted that she had taken several acting classes to get her degree. (R.T. 
836:10-13.) She testified that Overcash had a drug problem. (R.T. 886:8-16.) She also 
admitted that she had filed a half million dollar lawsuit against the apartment complex and 
admitted that she had to prove she was raped in order to establish liability. (R.T. 909:5-26; 
910:1-5.) In addition, Ms. B. gave conflicting accounts of the events immediately prior to the 
rape. Whereas she testified at trial that Balcom tied her hands first, she had earlier told a 
police officer that Balcom gagged her ffrst. (R.T. 861:5-11.) Additionally. Ms. B. had earlier 
stated that Balcom took her keys prior to the sex act, but she testified at trial that he took the 
keys afterwards. (R.T. 858:14-26; 859:1-11.)
Michael Baker, a resident at the Woodside complex, testified that he saw a black man 
near Ms. B.’s apartment between 1:00 and 2:00 A.M. (R.T. 1011:23-25.) He testified that the 
man leaving the area was carrying a long object wrapped in an orange towel. (R.T. 1012:4- 
12.) The man he saw was wearing a sweatshirt, jeans, and a baseball cap. (R.T. 1011:14-22.) 
However, he did not see this man carrying a camera or a glass jar full of quarters and 
admitted that he never saw a rifle. (R.T. 1019:12-19; 1021:1.) He also admitted that he 
would not have considered this man "suspicious" if the apartment security had not told him 
that a girl had just been raped. (R.T. 1020:15-20; 1021:26; 1022:1-4.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This brief will show that the trial court erred in admitting testimony of the Michigan 
rape for three reasons. First, the trial court committed a legal error by holding that intent is 
always an issue in forcible rape. (R.T. 678: 20-25.) The rule in California is and should be
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that a rape defendant's intent is not an issue when the defendant admits engaging in 
intercourse and only pleads that the prosecuting witness actually consented, as was the case 
here. The trial court cironeously held that intent was a material issue. As a matter of law, 
thc-defendant s intent was not an issue, and the evidence should not have been admitted to 
address it
Second, assuming arguendo that intent was an issue, the evidence of the ^4ichigan 
rape was irrelevant as a matter of law because it did not tend to prove the defendant’s intent 
in the instant case. The circumstances of the Michigan rape arc not sufficiently similar to this 
case to prove the defendant’s intent by direct inference. Moreover, dicre is no direct 
relationship between the two events. They involve different people and occur in different 
places at different times under completely different circumstances.
Third, the evidence should have been excluded because its probative value docs not 
substantially outweigh its prejudicial effect Because evidence of uncharged crimes is 
inherently prejudicial, the probative value must substantially outweigh the prejudicial effect 
for it to be admissible. Here, the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence:
Finally, admission of the Michigan rape constituted reversible error because it was 
reasonably probable that without the evidence of the Michigan rape the jury would have 
rendered a verdict favorable to the defendant Hie evidence corroborating the defendant’s 
testimony was strong. Moreover, the jury in the first trial, which considered substantially the 




I. THE MICHIGAN RAPE CONVICTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED 
FROM THE EVIDENCE BECAUSE IT DID NOT GO TO PROVE ANY 
MATERIAL FACT AT ISSUE, BUT WENT SOLELY TO PROVE THE 
_DEFENDANT’S DISPOSITION TO COMMIT RAPE. _
Evidence of uncharged crimes is inadmissible when it is offered solely to prove the
defendant’s criminal disposition to commit the charged crime. Sec, e.e.. People v. Kellev. 66
Cal.2d 232, 238 (1967); Cal. Evid. Code § 1101(a) (West 1989).*  However, evidence of
other crimes may be admitted for the limited purpose of proving a material fact such as
identity, motive, opportunity or intent Cal. Evid. Code § 1101(b) (West 1989).* The
material fact for which the evidence is admitted to prove must actually be in dispute. People
V. Thompson. 27 Cal.3d 303, 315 (1980). If an accused has not actually placed that material
fact in issue, evidence of uncharged offenses generally may not be admitted to prove it Id.:
People V. Thomas. 20 Cal.3d 457, 467 (1978). In the case at bar, the trial court erroneously
admitted the Michigan rape to address the defendant’s "intent" because the defendant’s intent
was not a material fact in issue.
A. The Michigan rape should not have been admitted to address the defendant’s
intent because intent is not an issue in a charge of forcible rape when the
defendant admits engaging in intercourse with the prosccutine witness and only
' ■ [EJvidence of a person's character or a trait of his or her 
character (whether in the form of an opinion, evidence of 
reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or her 
conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct 
on a specified occasion,- Cal. Evid. Code § 1101(a) (West 1989).
* Evidence that a person committed a prior crime is 
admissible when relevant to prove some fact such as motive, intent, 
preparation, plan, Icnowledge, identity, absence of mistake or 
accident, or whether a defendant in a prosecution for an unlawful 
sexual act did not reasonably and in good faith believe that the 
victim consented. Cal. Evid. Code § 1101(b) (West 1989).
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raises actual consent as a defense.
This Court authorized the rule that a defendant’s intent in a charge of forcible rape is 
not an issue when the defendant admits engaging in intercourse and only raises actual consent 
as a-defensc. People v. Tassell. 36 CaL3d 77, 88 n.7 (1984). The dcfcndanl-in Tassell was 
charged with rape, and he contended that the alleged victim unequivocally consented to 
intercourse. Id This Court stated that any evidence of the defendant’s prior rape convictions 
could not be admitted to address the defendant’s intent because it was not ambiguous. Id 
"Whichever version of the facts is believed, [the] defendant intended intercourse. On his 
evidence, [the prosecuting witness] unmistakably consented On hers, he accomplished the 
intended act against her will by use of force and threats." Id (emphasis added). This CTouit 
added that the prior offenses were not admissible to negate a mistaken but reasonable belief 
that the prosecuting witness consented since no such defense was ever suggested Id
This rule was applied under circumstances indistinguishable from our case in People v.
153 Cal.App.3d 888 (1984), and People v. Bmce. 208 CaLApp.3d 1099 (1989). In 
the defendant was charged with rape and pleaded actual consent as a defense. Key. 153 
Cal.App.3d at 892. The court held that the consent defense does not place the subjective, 
general intent of the defendant at issue because the defendant’s intent is not an element of the 
corpus delicti of forcible rape. ^ at 895. On the contrary, this defense only disputes the 
state of mind of the prosecuting witness, and the prosecution in such a case need only prove 
that the alleged victim did not consent Id If the prosecuting witness consented, no forcible 
rape occurred even if the defendant intended to rape. Id at 898.
Similarly in Bruce, the defendant in a rape case raised the defense of actual consent
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after stipulating to having intercourse with the alleged victim and specifically did not raise the
reasonable good faith belief in consent defense. Bruce. 208 Cal.App.3d at 1103. The court
held that evidence of prior conduct could not be admitted to prove intent because the
defendant's intent was not at issue, at 1105-6. The defendant presented na evidence of
his state of mind, but, instead, challenged the alleged victim’s credibility. Id.
"[Defendant] argued that [the alleged victim] actually consente4 not that he believed 
that she consented. Without any evidence supporting a Mavberrv defense [reasonable 
good faith belief in consent] and absent any attempt by [the defendant] to put this 
defense before the jury, the issue of whether he reasonably and in good faith believed 
that [the alleged victim] consented to intercourse was not at issue at trial."
Id. (emphasis in original). Therefore, the only ultimate fact the defendant placed in issue at
trial was whether the prosecuting witness actually consented, and evidence of a prior rape has
no tendency to prove whether or not the prosecuting witness in the present case consented.
Id
From the language the courts used in Tassell. Key and Bruce, the "intended act" in 
rape is sexual intercourse. To constitute a violation of California Penal Code section 261 the 
act must be done with force or fear and against the will of the victim. If the defendant 
admits to having intercourse, then his intent is unequivocal and is no longer an issue. If the 
defendant contends that the alleged victim actually and unmistakably consented to intercourse, 
then the only issue is whether the intercourse was consensual or against the victim’s will.
This issue focuses solely on the prosecuting witness’ mental state. The defendant's intent 
ceases to be an issue, and, therefore, evidence of prior acts is inadmissible to address it 
Applying the law to our case mandates the conclusion that the defendant’s "intent" 
was not an issue and that evidence of the Michigan rape was inadmissible to address it As
A
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in Key and Bruce, the defendant in the instant case admitted to engaging in intercourse and
only raised consent as a defense. Thus, his intent to engage in the act of intercourse was
unequivocal and unambiguous. It was not a material issue. Evidence of prior crimes or the
MTchigan rape could not be admitted under Cal. Evid. Code section 1101(15) to address it. By
only raising the defense of actual consent, the only material fact the defendant placed in issue
was whether the prosecuting witness actually consented to intercourse. The conduct of
another rape victim is not probative of this prosecuting witness* conduct
1. This rule is consistent with the manner in which this Court has viewed rape.
In Kelley, this Court said, "It is not and should not be the law ... that [a] defendant's
not guilty plea places his intent in issue so that proof of sex offenses with others is always
admissible." Kelley. 66 Cal.2d at 242 (emphasis in original). This Court stated,
[If the acts committed] indisputably show an evil intent and the defendant does not 
specifically raise the issue of intent, the better reasoned cases hold that evidence of 
other crimes is admissible only when they were performed with the prosecuting 
witness (citations) or . .. [when they go to show] a common scheme or plan.
Id at 243.
Respondent’s position lies in direct contradiction to this Court’s perspective of rape. 
Respondent argues that merely because the defendant pleaded not guilty to forcible rape and 
because he contended that Ms. B. actually consented to intercourse, the defendants’ mental 
state is automatically at issue. Under this logic, every time a rape defendant pleads not 
guilty, his intent would be at issue, and prior crimes would automatically be admissible to 
address his intent. Kelley explicitly asserts that this should not be the law.
Secondly, rape is a general intent crime. See, e.g.. People v. Guthreau. 102 
Cal.App.3d 436, 443 (1980); People v. Butcher. 174 Cal.App.2d 722 (1959), Thus, the
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speciHc intent to commit rape or have intercourse against the will of the victim is not an 
clement of the crime. The law does not require the prosecution to prove any specific mental 
clement to establish rape. Although the general intent to do the unlawful act must be 
established to convict a defendant of rape, the prosecution need not introduce additional 
evidence, such as the Michigan rape, to prove that die defendant possessed that general intent 
to commit rape. Like all other general intent crimes, the jury can infer the general intent to 
commit rape from the act itself.
The Respondent’s argument converts rape from a general intent crime to a specific 
intent crime. If a rape defendant’s intent is always an issue when he pleads not guilty as 
Respondent suggests, then in each case the prosecution would need to prove that the 
defendant had the intent to engage in sexual intercourse with force or fear against the will of 
the victim. Intent would become part of the corpus delicti of rape. This position contradicts 
hundreds of years of jurisprudence.
The rule regarding rape as a general intent crime works to the advantage of the 
prosecution by making rape easier to prove. Not only docs the prosecution need not admit 
evidence to prove the defendant’s intent, but the defendant cannot raise certain defenses such 
as intoxication as a defense to negate intent See, e.e.. People v. Bishop. 132 Cal^pp.3d 
717, 722 (1982) (holding that rape is a general intent crime and voluntary intoxication is not 
a defense). Adopting the Respondent’s argument would make "intent" a part of the corpus 
delicti of rape and, thus, make rape harder to prove in general.
2. Sound public policy supports the rule that evidence of prior crimes is
inadmissible to address the defendant’s intent in a rape charge when the 
defendant admits enEaging in intercourse and only raises actual consent as a
defense.
12
A rule excluding prior convictions helps prevent a person not guilty of the charge 
before him from being improperly found guilty. People v. Fries. 24 Cal.3d 222, 231*32 
(1979). Innocent defendants suffer when evidence of similar past crimes are admitted 
because this evidence inevitably persuades a jury that the defendant must be guilty of the 
crime charged because he has been guilty of such crimes in the past Id at 232. There is 
grave danger that the jury vrill decide that because of prior convictions, the accused "ought to 
be put away without too much concern with the present guilt" McCormick, Evidence 5 43 
(2d ed. 1972). Furthermore, in comparison to the grave danger of prejudice to the accused, 
the inference to the charged crime established by prior crimes is insubstantial. People v. 
Thompson. 27 Cal.3d 303, 317 (1980). Finally, this kind of evidence produces an "over­
strong" tendency to believe the defendant guilty of the charge merely because he is a person 
likely to do such acts. 1 Wigmore, Evidence, § 194 (3rd cd. 1940).
Concerns such as these prompted the United States Supreme Court to assert that 
evidence of prior convictions "is said to weigh too much with the jury and to overpersuade 
them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend 
against a particular charge." Michelson v. United States. 335 U.S. 469, 476 (1948). In sum, 
the amount of unfair prejudice this kind of evidence creates is so severe that it should be 
admitted only under narrow circumstances, not every time a defendant pleads not guilty.
Adopting the Respondent’s position would obviate the policy supporting this rule. Under 
the Respondent’s theory, every time a rape defendant pleads not guilty his intent would be at 
issue and evidence of a prior rape would be admissible. In virtually every rape case, prior 
rape convictions would be admissible. The defendant who stands innocent before proven
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guilty would lose the protection this rule attempts to guard and would be subject to the 
extreme danger of unfair prejudice in the minds of the jurors.
The Tassell. Key and Bruce rationale is more fair because it allows evidence of 
uncharged rapes to be admitted to address intent only when it is actually at issue. The 
defendant only places the onus on his mental state when he asserts that he "reasonably 
believed" that the prosecuting witness consented, though she may not actually have consented. 
Uncharged crimes would then be admissible to address the defendant's intent Where the 
defendant pleads that the prosecuting witness actually consented, the onus is placed on the 
prosecution to prove that the prosecuting witness did not actually consent In such a case, 
evidence of the defendant’s prior crimes would be irrelevant because it addresses neither the 
prosecuting witness's credibility nor her state of mind. It would only go to show the 
defendant's disposition in violation of Cal. Evid, Code section 1101(a).
B. Evidence of the Michigan rape should not have been admitted to address the
reasonable good faith belief in consent defense because that defense was
inelevant in the instant case.
The defense of actual consent is distinct from the defense of reasonable, good faith 
belief in consent A defendant who raises consent as a defense does not necessarily assert a 
second defense of reasonable good faith belief in consent [hereinafter Mavberrv defense]. 
Bnic^ 208 Cal.App.3d at 1104; People v. Burnham. 176 CaLApp.3d 1134, 1147 (1986); 
People v. Romero 171 Cal.App.3d 1149, 1155 (1985). When the defendant claims that die 
prosecuting witness consented, the jury must weigh the evidence and determine which party is 
telling the truth. Romero. 171 Cal.App.3d at 1155. In contrast, the Mavberrv defense 
permits the jury to conclude that both the prosecuting witness and the accused are telling the
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truth; it allows the defendant to claim that he reasonably believed that the prosecuting witness 
consented to intercourse because he operated under a mistake of fact resulting from equivocal 
behavior on the prosecuting witness* behalf. People v. Mavberrv. 15 CaL3d 143, 153-58 
(1975): ~
The Mavberrv defense requires a mistake of fact and cannot not be raised without 
substantial evidence supporting it People v. Rhoades. 193 Cal.App.3d 1362, 1368 (1987); 
Burnham. 276 Cal.App.3d at 1146-47. There must be substantial evidence from which the 
jurors could conclude that the defendant acted under a mistake of fact that created a 
reasonable belief that the prosecuting witness consented. Rhoades. 193 Cal.App.3d at 1368. 
In addition, substantial evidence of equivocal conduct on behalf of the prosecuting witness is 
necessary.. Romero. 171 CIal.App.3d at 1149. Moreover, doubts as to the sufficiency of the 
evidence to warrant giving jury instructions should be resolved in favor of the accused.
People V. Flannel. 25 C^3d 668, 685 (1979).
In the instant case, the defendant did not raise the Mavberrv defense, and it should not 
have been an issue for two reasons.^ Since under Bruce and Romero this defense is distinct 
from the defense of actual consent, the defendant was not obligated to raise it First mistake 
of fact is an affirmative defense. Mavberrv. 15 CaL3d at 157. It is not a component of a
^ A trial court's duty to instruct sua sponte on a particular 
defense arises only if it appears that the defendant is relying on 
such a defense, or if there is substantial evidence supportive of 
such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the 
defendant's theory of the case. People v. Sedeno. 10 Cal.3d 703, 
716 (1974) . There was no duty to instruct sua sponte on the 
Mavberrv defense in the instant case because there was no evidence 
supporting this defense, the defendant did not rely on it, and it 
was inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case, which was 
that the prosecuting witness actually consented.
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prima facia case of rape, and the prosecution need not necessarily prove that the defendant 
did not have a mistake of fact to establish rape. If the defendant does not raise this defense, 
then it is not an issue. The defendant in our case specifically wished not to raise the 
Mayberry defense. (R.T. 677:3-10.) The prosecution cannot admit evidence of uncharged 
crimes to negate an affirmative defense that is not raised.^
Respondent's argument proposes a bootstrap operation. Respondent is attempting to 
force the defendant to raise a defense so as to allow admission of highly prejudicial evidence 
to negate that defense. The Mayberry defense was designed to benefit and protect a rape 
defendant when the prosecuting witness engaged in equivocal behavior that could have been 
interpreted by the defendant as consent The prosecution should not be allowed to force the 
defendant to plead this defense in order to place the defendant's intent at issue and, thus, 
allow the uncharged crime to be admitted. By forcing the defendant to raise a defense, the 
prosecution is interfering with the defendant's right to control his own defense, violating 
fundamental notions of fairness.
Second, under Romero and Rhoades, the Mayberry defense could not have been raised 
in the instant case. In a rape case, when the defendant and the prosecuting witness’ versions 
of the events are completely incompatible, there is no "gray" area from which a jury could 
infer the defendant had a reasonable good faith belief in consent Rhoades. 193 Cal.App.3d
* Thus, our case can be distinguished from Mavberrv and 
Burnham. ^ In those cases, the defendants requested that 
instructions on the Mavberrv defense be given to the jury. 
Mavberrv, 15 Cal.3d at 153; Burnham 176 Cal.App,3d at 1139. In 
those cases, the defense, not the prosecution, raised mistake of 
fact as an issue. The prosecution could have admitted evidence to 
negate that defense.
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at 1367. Here, the defendant and the prosecuting witness proffered two con^Ietely 
incompatible versions of the events. According to the defendant, he was invited in to Ac 
apartment, and Ms. B. unequivocally agreed to have intercourse. According to Ms. B., Ae 
defendant entered Ae apartment and forced her to have sex at gunpoint The stories arc 
irreconcilable and cannot be harmonized.^ The jury could only have chided Aat Ac 
mtcrcoursc was ciAer completely consensual or was forced at gunpoint There is neiAcr any 
"gray area" nor any substantial evidence inAcating equivocal conduct from which Ac jury 
could infer Aat Ac defendant in good faiA reasonably believed Aat Ae prosecuting witness 
consented. Since any doubt regarding Ac sufficiency of evidence Aould be decided in favor 
of Ac accused, this Court should hold Aat Acre is insufficient evidence to raise this defense.
C. The Michigan rape evidence could not have been admitted to prove common 
scheme or plan or modus operand because Ae defendant's identity was not an
issue.
This Court held Aat nciAer "common scheme or plan" nor "modus operand" is 
relevant unless Ac identity of Ac defendant is an issue. Tasscll. 36 Cal.3d at 89. In Tassell. 
Ac defendant, charged wiA rape, admitted engaging in intercourse wiA Ae prosecuting 
wimess, but contended Aat Ac victim willingly consented. ^ at 80. The trial court admitted 
evidence of two prior sex offenses to show "common design or plan" and to "corroborate" Ac 
alleged victim's testimony. Id at 82. This Court held Aat this ruling was erroneous since 
Ae defendant’s identity was not an issue. Id
Prior to Tassell. a line of cases held Aat evidence of prior sex crimes by Ac defendant
® Unless the evidence reveals some wav to harmonize the 
conflicting accounts of the events given by the defendant and the 
prosecuting witness, the court need not instruct the jury with the 
Mayberry defense. Rhoades. 193 Cal.App.3d at 1369.
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is admissible in a sex case to corroborate the prosecuting witness* testimony, although the 
evidence does not necessarily address a material issue such as intent or identity. See, e.g.. 
People V. Kazee, 47 Cal.App.3d 593 (1975); People v Covert. 249 Cal.App.2d 81, 88 (1967). 
However, another line of cases held that evidence of prior crimes to establish modus operandi 
and common scheme or plan are admissible if identity is an issue. People v. Sam. 71 Cal.2d 
194 (1969); People v. Haston. 69 Cal.2d 233 (1968).
This Court rejected the corroboration theory. Tassell. 36 Cal.3d at 89. Unless identity 
or a "grand scheme" is an issue, allowing prior crimes into evidence under the label of 
"common plan or scheme" is in reality "bestowing a respectable label on a disreputable basis 
for admissibility, the defendant’s disposition."* Id at 84. What die "corroboration" theory 
conveys is that if the defendant acted a certain way in the past, then that prior act is evidence 
that he acted the same way in the instant case. This is exactly the use of prior crimes that 
Cal. Evid Code section 1101(a) prohibits. In the case at bar, admitting the evidence under 
"common scheme or plan" would be tantamount to admitting the evidence of the defendant’s 
disposition to prove his conduct Without evidence of a "grand scheme," "common scheme or 
plan" in the instant case is a euphemism for criminal disposition.
Moreover, the extremely unfair prejudice associated with this kind of evidence and the 
potential danger of it being used to prove a defendant’s disposition far outweighs any value of
This Court explains that ■common scheme* is an objective 
where a party claims that there is a "single conception or plot" of 
which the charged and uncharged crimes are individual 
manifestations; if such a "grand scheme" is at issue, then common 
scheme or plan is relevant. Tassell. 36 Cal.3d at 84. No 
■grand scheme" is involved in the instant case. Respondent does 
not contend that the two alleged rapes were connected.
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"corroborating*' the alleged victim's testimony. Ihe mental state of a past victim reveals 
nothing about the present prosecuting wimess. Thus, as a matter of law, this Court rejected 
the corroboration theory.
In our case, the identity of the defendant was not an issue. He admitted being in the 
prosecuting witness* apartment during the night in question. He does not claim that a 
different person committed the charged offense. Thus, the Michigan rape cannot be admitted 
into evidence under the rubric of "common scheme or plan."^
n. THE EVIDENCE OF THE MICHIGAN RAPE IS IRRELEVANT AND SHOULD
HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED BECAUSE XT DOES NOT TEND TO PROVE THE
DEFENDANT'S INTENT OR ANY OTHER MATERIAL FACT AT ISSUE IN THE
INSTANT CASE.
Admission of evidence of other crimes cannot be justified solely by identifying an 
admissible purpose. People v. Guerrero. 16 Cal.3d 719, 724 (1976). On the contrary, 
evidence of an uncharged crime to be admissible must tend to cither prove or disprove a 
material fact at issue. Thompson. 27 Cal.3d at 315. Even if the defendant's intent was at 
issue, the trial court erred by admitting the Michigan rape because the circumstances of the 
Michigan rape arc irrelevant to the issues of intent or common scheme or plan involved in 
this case.
A. The evidence docs not tend to prove the defendant's intent or common scheme 
or plan because there are insufficient similarities between the two offenses to 
create a logical inference that the defendant committed the charged offense.
Although there was some similarity between the two offenses, the degree of similarity
’ The trial court recognized this rule and the logic 
supporting it in the instant case. It said, "fere's . . . 
similarities, but those are primarily to establish identity. . . . 
If you're using motive, plan, scheme and design, that's to 
establish identity." (R.T. 679: 12-15.)
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is not strong enough to establish that the defendant used a common plan and scheme to 
commit the charged offense. In order for evidence of other crimes to be relevant to prove a 
material fact, the uncharged offense must "logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference" 
tend to establish that fact Cal. Evid. Code §§ 210, 600 (West 1966); People v. Schader. 71 
Cal.2d 771, 775 (1969). While this Court has noted that evidence of uncharged offenses may 
be relevant if "the offenses are not too remote, are similar to the offense charged, and are 
committed with persons similar to the prosecuting witness," it cautioned that this standard was 
simply a general statement of conditions which must exist prior to determining admissibility 
based on relevance. Kelley. 66 Cal.2d at 239.
This Court posited a specific test for relevancy to dctciminc whether to admit evidence 
of uncharged crimes to prove an issue in the charged offense. The test is that the uncharged 
offense must be sufficiently similar and possesses a high degree of common features with the 
act charged to be relevant People v. Cramer. 67 CaL2d 126, 130 (1967).* Furthermore, the 
court "must examine the precise elements of similarity between the offenses with respect to 
the issue for which the evidence is proffered and satisfy itself that each link of the chain of 
inference between the former and latter is reasonably strong." People v. SchadcL 71 Cal.2d 
at 764.
In Schader. the defendant placed his intent and motive at issue in a robbery charge. 
The prosecution alleged that the defendant’s uncle robbed a grocery store while the defendant, 
the accomplice, stood outside with a gun as a lookout Id at 768. Hie defendant claimed
* The court noted that such similarity must be "striking," 
■bizarre,■ and "peculiar" of characteristic behavior to satisfy 
this test. People v. Creighton. 57 Cal.App.3d 314, 323 (1976), 
citing Cramer. 67 Cal.2d at 129-130.
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that he was simply standing outside unaware that the co-defendant was inside robbing the 
store. Id at 768. The trial court admitted details of a past robbery committed by the 
defendant and his uncle to prove intent and motive. Id
This Court held that the prior robbery was relevant to prove the defendant’s intent and 
motive because the defendant used the same distinctive technique to commit robbery in the 
prior crime a he used in the crime charged Id at 771. In both cases the defendant stood 
outside as a lookout while his uncle robbed the store.’ Since the behavior of the two 
defendants in both cases was so similar, the prior crime was relevant to prove that the 
defendant knew that his uncle was actually robbing the store and that the defendant was not 
an innocent bystander.
By contrast, in People v. Guerrero. 16 Cal.3d 719 (1976), this Court applied the test 
enunciated in Schader and concluded that evidence of a past rape to prove the defendant’s 
intent should have been excluded because it was irrelevant In that case, the defendant was 
charged with first-degree murder of a 17-ycar old girl Id. An autopsy of the girl revealed 
no possibility of sexual molestation. Id However, the trial court admitted testimony of 
another 17-ycar old girl who claimed that the defendant and two friends raped her about 6 
weeks earlier to prove the defendant’s intent Id
In determining whether the evidence of the prior rape was relevant, the court
• "In each case, the robbers chose a supermarket as a target; 
the defendant worked with a single partner, a relative; the 
perpetrators used a stolen car for escape; one partner robbed cash 
registers, displaying a loaded pistol which was subsequently 
concealed; the other partner, standing by unobtrusively, but armed 
with a loaded pistol was available to participate in case of 
trouble.* Schader. 71 Cal.2d at 768.
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considered the sum total of the similarities: (1) the use of the same car, (2) the similarity of 
the age of the victims; (3) the initial presence of a male friend with defendant, and; (4) the 
fact that in both cases the parties were driving, cruising, and drinking in a vehicle. Id at 725. 
Despite these similarities, this Court stated that the evidence proffered to show intent was 
irrelevant Id at 729. This Court held that these similarities were superficial and so non- 
distinctive that they did not create any inference that the defendant intended premeditated 
murder. Id "It would be possible to list any number of marks common to the charged and 
uncharged crimes, each of which is so lacking in distinctiveness diat its presence ... is 
wholly lacking in significance.... The sum of zeroes, is always zero." I^ citing Haston.
69 Cal.2d at 246.
Although the evidence in our case meets the threshold test for admissibility, it does 
not meet the specific test this Court set forth in Schader. Not only are there few "precise 
elements of similarity," but those that exist do not justify any inference that because the 
defendant had the intent necessary for rape in the first offense he necessarily had the intent 
for rape in the instant case. This case is more analogous to Guerrero. As in Guerrero, the 
similarities between the two offenses in our case are superfrcial: the defendant engaged in 
sexual activity with both women; the defendant allegedly possessed a firearm; and the 
defendant stole the prosecuting witnesses' ATM cards and their cars. Beyond these 
superficial similarities, the prosecution cannot adduce any precise elements of similarity.
Even under the prosecuting witness' version of the events, gaping differences exist 
between the instant case and the uncharged crime. According to the Michigan rape victim, 
the defendant stopped her outside her apartment con^lex to ask for directions. (R.T. 1185:23-
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26; 1186:1-4.) He then used a gun to force his way into her car. (R.T. 1186:25-26.) The 
defendant drove the car to a secluded spot where he raped her. (R.T. 1187.) After taking her 
money and ATM card, the defendant dropped her off. (R.T. 1192:12-13.)
~The sequence of events as well as the actual details in this case can be distinguished 
from the Michigan rape. In the Michigan offense, the defendant used a B6-Gun, but in the 
present case Ms. B. testified that the defendant entered her home with a rifle. Unlike the 
uncharged offense, the defendant did not ask Ms. B. to peiform any oral sex acts. Moreover, 
in' the Michigan case, the sexual acts took place in a car rather than a house. (R.T. 674:9-26.) 
The Michigan rape victim testified that she offered to give the defendant her ATM PIN 
number in exchange for her freedom. (R.T. 1191:21-26.) In this case, Ms. B. testified that the 
defendant asked for the PIN number, which she initially refused, and then relinquished. (R.T. 
780:11-18.) In this case, Ms. B. was found gagged and bound, unlike the Michigan rape 
victim, who was dropped off.
Qearly, the alleged similarities are few compared to the differences. Unlike Schader. 
in which the distinctive and striking plan utilized by the defendant to commit robberies 
demonstrated that defendant's intent was not innocent, there are no "striking" similarities in 
this case which create a link between defendant's intent in the uncharged and charged offense. 
The facts of the Michigan incident arc not sufficiendy similar to give rise to the inference that 
the defendant had the intent to rape because it was committed in a different location, with a 
completely different person, under different circumstances. Rather, this case is similar to 
Guerrero where the list of common facts is wholly insignificant
Although defendant may have possessed the requisite intent for rape in the Michigan
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offense, it docs not follow that because he wore similar clothes and stoic some of Ms. B.’s 
possessions he had nonconsensual sex with her. The existence of a few similar circumstances 
do not prove intent, but only identity and intent to rob which are not at issue.
In both cases, it is undisputed that the defendant wore a baseball cap and similar type 
of clothing and did not pull his pants down all the way when engaging in intercourse. Hiese 
facts tend to prove neither intent nor common scheme or plan, but identity through a similar 
pattern of dressing and acting. To the extent that the similarities tend to prove common 
scheme or plan, the facts are only relevant to address the robbery issue. The fact that the 
defendant stole an ATM card and a car in the Michigan offense docs not logically have a 
bearing on intent to rape in this case, but is only relevant for creating the inference that 
defendant utilized a "common plan" to steal. When these similarities are placed aside, the 
remaiiting similarities are outweighed by the divergent circumstances surrounding the sexual 
acts in both cases.
B. Because there is no direct relationship between the prior offense and an
clement of the charged offense, the Michigan rape should have been excluded.
Even if similarities exist between the two offenses, there is no direct relationship 
between them to create the inference, that defendant intended to rape the prosecuting witness. 
In People v. Daniels, this Court held that past crimes arc admissible to prove an element of 
the charged offense where there is a direct relationship between the prior offense and an 
clement of the charged offense. People v, Daniels. 52 Cal.3d 815, 857 (1992). citing People 
V. Durham. 70 Cal.2d 171, 186-89 (1979). In Daniels, defendant was convicted of murdering 
two police officers. At trial, the prosecution had introduced evidence of defendant's flight
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following a previous bank robbery, including a police pursuit (by the two officers who were 
murdered) and the exchange of gunfire which left defendant a paraplegic. This Court 
concluded that despite the gap in time between the two cases, "there is a direct relationship 
between the police rendering defendant a paraplegic and defendant murdering the two officers 
in retribution." Id at 857.
Unlike the situation in Daniels, diere is no direct relationship between the Michigan 
rape and the charged offense because the Michigan rape is in no way connected to the 
charged crime. In both cases, the defendant intended to and did engage in intercourse. The 
key issue in this case is whether the prosecuting witness consented to having sex widi the 
defendant Evidence from the Michigan rape does not create any inference that the 
intercourse in this case was nonconsensual since the Michigan rape victim’s prior mental state 
is not related to Ms. B.’s consent
m. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE EVIDENCE BECAUSE ITS 
PROBATIVE VALUE WAS GREATLY OUTWEIGHED BY ITS PREJUDICIAL 
EFFECT.
California law provides, "The court in its discretion may exclude such evidence when 
the probative value is greatly outweighed ... by the probability that its admission will create 
substantial danger of undue prejudice." Cal. Evid. Code { 352 (West 1989). Assuming that 
the uncharged offense evidence is admissible to prove a disputed issue and is relevant the 
trial court must conduct a balancing test and weigh the probative value of the evidence 
against the potential danger of undue prejudice to the defendant pursuant to Cal. Evid. Code 
section 352. In order to be admissible, evidence of uncharged crimes must have substantial 
probative value to offset the substantial prejudicial effect inherent in evidence of uncharged
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offenses. Kelley, 66 Cal.2d at 239; Thompson. 27 CaL3d at 318. If evidence of an 
uncharged crime only marginally relates to a disputed issue, then it is not admissible.
^^suming arguendo that the Michigan rape was relevant to our case, the evidence of 
the uncharged offense did not have the probative value necessary to overcome prejudice to 
the defendant*® In this case, the prosecution did not demonstrate that the evidence of the 
uncharged rape was of substantial probative value. As argued above, the similarities are not 
strong enough, and there is no direct relationship between the two offenses from which the 
trier of fact could logically infer that defendant acted as he did in the uncharged offense.
The prosecution reasons that because the defendant robbed and raped a woman in 
Michigan, he is likely to have committed a similar offense under like circumstances.
However, this line of reasoning only tends to prove that the defendant was a "bad" person. 
From this intermediate fact, the prosecution concludes, because he is a bad person, he had the 
necessary intent in this case to rape Ms. B. This is unacceptable reasoning.
In contrast to the minimally probative value of the evidence, the evidence of the 
Michigan rape was highly prejudicial. Evidence of other crimes always involves the risk of 
serious prejudice. Griffin, 66 Cal.2d 459, 466 (1967); foUowed in Thompson, 27 Cal.3d at 
318. Thus, evidence should be received with extreme caution, and if its connection with the 
charged crime is not clear, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused. Kelley. 66 
Cal.2d at 239; Thomas. 20 Cal.3d at 466. Furthermore, this kind of evidence should be 
closely scrutimzed because it tends to shed light on character disposition, rather than any 
ultimate fact I^ Thompson. 27 Cal.3d at 305. As a general policy, this Court has held that
Relevancy is defined as evidence having a tendency to prove 
or disprove a disputed fact. Cal. Evid. Code § 210 (West 1966).
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"the risk of convicting the innocent... is sufficiently imminent for us to forego the slight 
marginal gain in punishing the guilty." Schader. 71 Cal.2d at 772-73; Thompson. 27 CaL3d 
at 317.
This policy of close scrutiny was exercised in People v Sam. 71 Cal.2d at 199. In
Sam, the defendant, after consuming alcohol with friends, became involved in a brawl with a
disruptive neighbor. Id When the neighbor attempted to use a Karate move, defendant used
physical violence to subdue the neighbor. Defendant subsequently rendered a series of sharp
blows and kicks, which resulted in the man's death. During trial, the prosecution was
permitted to introduce evidence of defendant's past acts with friends where he had become
abusive when drunk, kicking and lashing out at them, to show common scheme or plan, and
modus operandi, in opposition to defendant's claim of self-defense.
This Court held that the trial court abused its discretion under Cal. Evid. Code section
352 because the evidence was highly prejudicial and had little probative value. The prior
acts of the defendant's two drunken brawls were not probative of whether defendant actually
used self-defense in the charged offense. ^ at 204. This Court concluded.
If there was a concatenation of events, it was tenuous at best, whereas the prejudicial
effect of the evidence is patent_ __ By use of this strategm, the prosecution was able
to place before the jury the largely irrelevant but manifestly harmful information that 
defendant was a man who often drank to excess and was frequently drunk; that he was 
often belligerent and fought with others .... In short, defendant was made to appear 
to be an antisocial individual of generally bad character, an immoral person unworthy 
of the jury's belief or consideration.
Id at 205.
Similarly, in this case, the prejudicial effect of the Michigan rape was overwhelming 
when compared to the tenuous inference it established As in Sam, from the surface
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similarities between the two eases, such as the theft of the ATM card and car and the use of
firearms, the jury could have concluded that the defendant was a violent and bad person, not
worthy of their consideration. Here, the jury was allowed to view the emotional victim, who
testified in vivid detail as to the harmful acts the defendant committed upon her. The net
effect to the jury was to paint a sign on [the defendant] which said ’rapist’." People v.
Holbrook. 43 Cal.App.3d 636. 640-41 (1974). Under these conditions, the trial court clearly
abused its discretion in admitting the testimony of the Michigan rape victim.
IV. THE ERRONEOUS ADMISSION OF THE TESTIMONY OF THE MICHIGAN 
RAPE VICTIM CONSTITUTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BECAUSE IT WAS 
REASONABLY PROBABLE THAT WITHOUT SUCH TESTIMONY THE JURY 
WOULD HAVE A REACHED A VERDICT FAVORABLE TO THE DEFENDANT.
The California Constitution provides that no judgment shall be set aside unless there
was a miscamage of justice.” A miscarriage of justice should be declared when "[t]hc court.
after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, is of the opinion that it is
reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been
reached in the absence of the error." People v. Watson. 46 Cal.2d 818. 836 (1956). The
appellant need not prove that it is more probable than not or equally possible that he would
have received a favorable result without the error. Rather, the appellant only needs to show
that it is reasonably possible that the outcome would have been different in order to obtain
reversal based on prejudicial error. Id at 837.
This Court has looked at several factors in determining whether or not a more
"No judgment shall be set aside or new trial granted, in any 
case, on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or of the improper 
admission or rejection of evidence, or for any error, unless . . . 
the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has 
resulted in a miscarriage of justice." Cal. Const, art. VI, § 13.
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favorable outcome to the defendant would have been reached. First, die strength of the 
defendant’s ease without the erroneously admitted evidence is a factor. People v. Guzman. 45 
Cal.3d 915 (1988); People v. Coleman. 48 Cal.3d 112, 144 (1989). If the defendant’s 
testimony, defense, and evidence arc plausible, then together they may establish a reasonable 
probability that the case could have been decided the other way.
Second, in the case of a hung jury in the first trial, similarities between the two trials 
may determine whether error is prejudicial when the erroneous inclusion of an uncharged 
offense in a second trial results in a conviction. Kelley. 66 Cal.2d at 245. Kelley held that 
this admission ’’demonstrates almost to a certainty the prejudicial nature of the erTor." Id^ at 
245.
Applying the above factors, a miscarriage of justice has resulted in this case because 
it is more than reasonably probable that but for the prejudicial evidence an outcome more 
favorable to the defendant would have resulted. First, defense counsel presented evidence 
supporting the defendant’s testimony in both trials. Several eyewitnesses who placed the 
defendant at the Woodside Complex, prior to die day of the rape buttressed his defense.
Mary Vivian Ray testified that she had seen the defendant on the premises of the complex 
during the weeks prior to the alleged rape. (R.T. 1042:16-22.) Additionally, Saeid Hariri 
testified that he had seen the defendant and Ms. B. together on the premises. (R.T. 1075:7- 
12.) Their stories tended to corroborate the defendant’s story that he had visited the coiiq)lex 
twice before the incident with his friend Tate, to visit Overcash.
Defense counsel also provided a motive for Ms. B.’s accusations. Ms. B. admitted 
that she needed to prove the rape to succeed in her lawsuit against the apartment complex.
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Additionally, defense counsel clearly raised doubts as to Ms. B.*s credibility by showing the 
jury the inconsistencies in her statements given to the police versus her testimony. Thus, but 
for the prejudicial testimony of the Michigan rape victim, the jury could have reasonably 
concluded that the defendant was not guilty of raping Ms. B. because there was evidence in 
his favor, as well as evidence tending to diminish Ms. B.'s credibility.
Furthermore, the evidence against the defendant was not overwhelming. In the first 
trial in which there was a hung jury, the evidence was substantially the same, except for the 
Michigan rape. The evidence without th’e Michigan rape was insufficient on its own to 
convince the jury that the defendant raped Ms. B. Thus, the Court can infer that the only 
difference which created a diiferent result in the second trial was the erroneous inclusion of 
the Michigan rape victim’s testimony.
The only other difference between the two trials was the testimony of Michael Baker, 
who alleged that he saw the defendant departing from the apartment complex on the night in 
question. Baker’s testimony, however, docs not weaken the probability that a more favorable 
outcome would have been reached because the jury could reasonably have concluded that he 
was not a credible witness. Baker testified that he saw the defendant departing from the 
stairwell with a long object wrapped in an orange towel. (R.T. 1012:23-25.) However, his 
description of the defendant clashed with the one given by Ms. B. First, Baker stated that the 
defendant was wearing a t*shirt, when the defendant was wearing a sweatshirt Second, 
according to the prosecuting witness, the defendant left her apartment carrying a jar full of 
coins, her wallet and her camera, yet Mr. Baker stated that he did not see any of these items 
on the defendant’s person. (R.T. 1019:12-18.)
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More importantly, defense counsel pointed out these inconsistencies to the jury. 
Defense counsel also pointed out that Baker admitted that he had not been suspicious of the 
defendant, or surmised that defendant was carrying a gun until he was informed a rape had 
been committed. (R.T. 1020:15-20; 1021:26; 1022:1-4.) The defense mitigated the 
possibility that the jury might have based even part of tfieir decision on his testimony. Thus, 
the jury could have based their decision largely on the Michigan rape victim’s testimony. 
Therefore, because the erroneous admission of the evidence resulted in a miscarriage of 
justice, the defendant’s conviction should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
The trial court below erred as a matter of law by admitting evidence of the Michigan 
rape to address the defendant’s intent because neither the defendant’s intent nor common 
scheme or plan was a material issue. Moreover, the Michigan rape was irrelevant to prove 
the defendant’s intent even if it was a material issue. In addition, the trial court abused its 
discretion by admitting this evidence because the probative value of the Michigan rape did 
not substantially outweigh its prejudicial effect Finally, the trial court's mistake constitutes 
reversible error. For these reasons, Petitioner prays this Court to reverse the conviction 
below.
Dated: November 5, 1992.
Respectfully Submitted,
Somnath Chatteijee
Shashikala Bhat 
Counsel for Petitioner
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